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1 Introduction
Within the last decade, a number of new family
laws were passed in Egypt, with important
ramifications for women. In 2000, a
comprehensive procedural law (Personal Status
Law, PSL No. 1) was passed, granting women the
right to obtain no-fault divorce (khul) in
exchange for giving up their rights to dower and
alimony. In 2004, new family courts were
established introducing a mediation-based and
family-sensitive legal process. Furthermore, in
that same year, PSL No. 11 was passed, which set
up a government fund through which female
disputants are paid court-ordered alimony.
Finally, in 2005, PSL No. 4 was passed, which
extended divorced mothers’ rights to child
custody until their children (boy or girl) reach
the age of 15. The outcomes of these reforms,
however, have been mixed and for the most part
still fall short of addressing the inequalities and
vulnerabilities from which women suffer.
The aim of this article is to shed light on two
issues, which complicate and perhaps diminish
the transformative role that the new legal
reforms could play in strengthening Egyptian
women’s rights and achieving gender justice.
First, I argue that despite the recently passed
laws, the institutional model of marriage that the
state continues to uphold through its codes and
court system is premised on gendered roles and
rights for husbands and wives. This legal model of
marriage; however, contradicts the realities of
Egyptian marriages. Second, the incongruence
between the agendas of different reform actors,
their piecemeal approach, and their top-down
and non-participatory strategies have impacted
the reform outcomes in mixed ways. This has
meant that the multidimensionality and the
social-embeddedness of the process of law-
making have not been adequately taken into
account in the reform efforts undertaken by both
state and non-state actors, thereby undermining
the effectiveness and significance of these
endeavours.
This article draws on an ongoing three-year
ethnographic study of recent reforms in Egyptian
personal status laws. The study started in
January 2007. Field data was collected through
interviews with female and male plaintiffs,
judges, mediation specialists, lawyers, legislators,
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women’s rights activists, public thinkers,
religious scholars, and members of the religious
establishment.1 In addition, court proceedings in
family law cases were observed, and a content
analysis of court records was conducted.
2 Constructing marriage in modern Egyptian
Family Laws
Egypt, like all other Middle Eastern countries
with the exception of Turkey, adopts family laws
that are drawn from the doctrines of classical
schools of Islamic law. Reform efforts thus have
to engage with the model of marriage and
marital relations that is sanctioned by Islamic
legal schools. But is the Islamic model of
marriage inherently discriminatory against
women? Abu Odeh (2004) and Mir-Hosseini
(2003) argue that the main schools of Islamic
Jurisprudence share a gendered model of
marriage in which the relations between
husbands and wives tend to be hierarchical. In
this model, Islamic marriage is based on a
contractual agreement between a man and a
woman in which the husband has the duty to
provide for his wife and their offspring and in
return, the wife avails of herself to him and puts
herself under his authority and protection. The
husband’s exclusive right to his wife’s sexual and
reproductive labour is earned through and
conditioned upon his economic role. This model
of marriage does not recognise shared
matrimonial resources. Whatever possessions and
assets the wife brings to the marriage remain
hers. Likewise, apart from maintenance for
herself and her children, the wife cannot make
claims to resources acquired by the husband
during marriage. In addition, the husband has
unilateral right to repudiation and polygamy.
Nonetheless, the schools of Islamic
Jurisprudence show considerable difference in
the specificity of spousal rights and duties; a
plurality that often worked for women, as
historical studies of pre-codification eras in the
Muslim world show (Tucker 2008; Hallaq 2009).
In fact, historians who studied the trajectories of
modern Muslim family laws argue that the
gender inequality and biases against women
found in present day family codes cannot be
simply explained away by their religious sources.
For example, Abdel Rahim (1996) and Sonbol
(2005) traced the discrimination against women
that is embedded in modern laws to modernist
notions of building cohesive nuclear families that
could be disciplined and controlled by modern
nation-states. Sonbol (2005) argues that the
process of codification of Muslim family laws was
not only based on the doctrines of one or several
Islamic legal schools but also on borrowings from
colonial European laws. She shows that the
project of subject-making and nation-building
that was undertaken by modern Muslim nation-
states in the twentieth century incorporated
modernist European notions that perceived
nuclear families as the essential blocks for
progressive and well-governed societies. This
discourse shifted the purpose of marriage from
regulating a contractual relationship between a
man and woman to creating nuclear families and
maintaining their cohesiveness. Modern nation-
states saw the nuclear patriarchal family as the
institution in which individuals were reproduced
as citizens and dutiful members of the nation. To
enable families to fulfil their roles in the process
of subject-making, these states devised family
laws that regulated the rights and duties of
family members. Husbands were bestowed with
the responsibility of heading the family and
providing for its family members. In return for
the protection and financial support that women
and children received from the husband/father,
they owed him obedience and submission.
Article 1 in Egypt’s first codified family code,
PSL No. 25 of 1920, defines a husband’s main
role as the provider for his wife, while the role of
the latter is to be sexually available to the
husband. The law, furthermore, makes a wife’s
right to her husband’s financial support
conditional on her fulfilment of her sexual role.
To fulfil her sexual role, the wife is expected to
be physically available in the conjugal home.
Article 11 in PSL No. 25 stipulates that a wife
who is found by the court to be disobedient
(nashiz) loses her right to her husband’s financial
support. Disobedience is defined as a wife’s
refusal to reside in the conjugal home with her
husband. The law stipulates that this home has
to be adequate and safe and the court needs to
ascertain that the wife’s desertion was not due to
a reason sanctioned by the social norms (urf).
The law does not spell out what these reasons
are, but it is commonly understood that these
would include leaving the conjugal home to visit
extended family or to seek education or
healthcare. Whether a wife’s leaving the
conjugal home for work is considered a socially
acceptable reason has been contested by litigants
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and judges. According to law PSL No. 100 of
1985, if a wife has written in her marriage
contract that she holds a job, a husband cannot
bring an obedience ordinance case against her on
the basis of her going out to work. A wife who
receives a disobedience judgement from the
court loses her right to financial support from
her husband.2
The subsequent family code (PSL No. 25 of 1929)
also granted both spouses unequal rights and was
discriminatory against women in many aspects.
Men had an unfettered right to unilateral
repudiation and polygamy; they enjoyed full
guardianship over their children, whereas women
had highly restricted access to divorce and could
not be the legal guardians of their children even
when they were the custodial parents. The new
Egyptian Child Law, which was passed in June
2008, grants custodial female parents
guardianship over their children. However,
existing personal status laws still deny this.
In 1979, the late President Sadat decreed PSL
No. 44 of 1979, which included revolutionary
reforms. PSL No. 44 protected working women
from obedience ordinance suits from their
husbands on the grounds of their leaving the
conjugal home to work and affirmed their right
to spousal financial support. Other reforms
included a wife’s automatic right to judicial
divorce if her husband enters into a new
marriage without her having to prove injury; and
her right to the conjugal home in the case of
divorce if she has the custody of the children.
The new law also legislated mut’a (indemnity) for
women who are divorced by their husbands
without their desire or fault (Fawzy 2004). To
avoid opposition from religious establishment,
Islamist groups, and other conservative factions
in the society, President Sadat decreed the law at
a time when the Parliament was not in session.
PSL No. 44 of 1979, however, was later annulled
by the High Supreme Court in 1985 because the
process through which it was passed was ruled to
be unconstitutional. That same year, its
replacement PSL No. 100 was passed. The new
law lacked many of the revolutionary articles of
its predecessor.
Thus, marriage as constructed by the Egyptian
modern laws is one in which a husband supports
his wife and children, provides for them an
adequate and safe conjugal home, and is
considered by the legal institution as the
guardian and the leader of this family unit. In
exchange, a wife is expected to fulfil the sexual
needs of her husband, to be physically available in
the conjugal home, and to care for the children,
although she cannot claim guardianship over
them. Her role is sexualised and her rights are
unequal to her husband’s. But does this
institutional model of marriage fit with the lived
experiences of Egyptian women and men?
3 Lived experiences of marriage
Marriage continues to be an important social
institution in which Egyptians invest to seek
stability, security and social acceptability as well
as to forge social and economic alliances between
families. For the women interviewed for this
study, the process of getting married involved
finding a partner, negotiating each partner’s
share of the costs of marriage, and entering into
marriage with adequate protection against
divorce and abandonment. However, these
different aspects of the process were not
necessarily congruent with one another.
Negotiations and compromises had to be made.
Some women strategised better than others, but
still many entered into marriages which were
inherently based on precarious foundations such
as reliance on meagre resources that were
shared with in-laws; husband’s irregular
employment status; discrepancy between
husband’s and wife’s perceptions about their
financial roles in the marriage and the realities
of their economic needs; pursuit of partners with
economic assets at the expense of emotional and
educational compatibility; as well as the unequal
and hierarchical legal rights and obligations of
husbands and wives. Many of the interviewed
women worked before marriage. Some continued
to work after marriage either regularly or
intermittently, while others discontinued. But
the majority of the women were sceptical that
their work strengthened their marital rights and
relations.
The legal gendering of marriage takes place
through the interplay between different state
codes (i.e. labour, social security and family),
which is often disempowering to women. It is not
only the case that gendered notions of men and
women’s roles in family laws contribute to labour
or social security laws that discriminate against
women and their spouses. It is also the case that
labour or social security laws that discriminate
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against women destabilise their marriages. For
example, widowed women are sometimes forced
to enter into unregistered marriages (urfi), in
which they can make no legal claims to financial
support or inheritance from their second
husbands, so that they can keep the pensions of
their deceased partners. Also, in the course of
this research, I have come across married women
in their sixties whose husbands did not support
their families because either they earned very
little and intermittently from informal labour, or
because they were absent partners who
repeatedly abandoned and then returned to the
conjugal home. The wives engaged in a variety of
informal labour to make ends meet and were at a
stage of their lives in which they could no longer
sustain work because of poor health. A number of
these women were in the process of divorcing
their husbands through khul because they wanted
to be eligible for monthly payments from the
state’s social aid and assistance programme
(SAA). According to SAA regulations, in order to
receive monthly cash, female beneficiaries have
to prove that they have dire economic needs and
that they are divorced, widowed, or have been
deserted by their husbands for at least four years.
In fact, recent studies of government welfare
show that programmes such as the SAA are
operated on the basis of a philosophy and work
practice that gender the roles and needs of its
female beneficiaries and expect them to be in
abject poverty and without male partner/provider
(Bibars 2001; Sabry 2005).
4 The new Family Courts: implementation
challenges
Effective implementation of the new laws is
impaired by a number of shortcomings, which
subsequently impact women’s access to justice.
For instance, the failure to obligate disputants to
attend mediation sessions result in making pre-
litigation mediation an ineffective tool of dispute
resolution. In addition, lack of resources and
enforcement mechanisms as well as the poor
training of court personnel diminish the
effectiveness of the alternative mechanisms of
dispute resolution which the new court system
offers.
Most of all, the legal process in the new court
system is gendered through its discourse and
practices. In this discourse, women are
considered as emotional and hasty, and therefore
incapable of making rational decisions about
ending their marriages. Some of the interviewed
mediation specialists and court experts hold the
belief that women resort to khul hastily over
petty reasons such as a disagreement over the
colour of the upholstery for the furniture in the
conjugal home. This scepticism about women’s
rationality, particularly when it comes to
decisions about divorce, is also accompanied by
practices that some mediation specialists and
judges use when they attempt to reconcile
disputants. A common practice is to warn the
female disputant of the difficulties and stigma
that awaits her if she becomes a divorced woman.
In one of the observed court sessions, for
example, the senior judge tried to persuade a
plaintiff to reconsider her divorce claim by
warning her that her young daughter would
probably have a difficult life with limited
prospects for marriage and respectability if her
mother becomes a divorcee through khul. In
addition, this legal discourse depicts female
sexuality as the object of her husband’s control.
It is assumed by lawyers and judges that it is
men’s legal obligation to guard the sexual
honour of their wives. Thus, lawyers’ briefs and
court judgements often contain legal claims that
are based on this notion. However, the texts of
the substantive laws while affirming men’s
financial obligation towards their wives do not
assign husbands an obligation to protect the
sexual honour of their wives.
But women are appropriating the new laws in
ways that are advantageous to their individual
needs, albeit not necessarily enhancing collective
gender equality and justice. For instance, the
right to khul is being used by female plaintiffs for
a variety of purposes such as to opt out of an
abusive marriage without the hassle of proving
harm, or to claim welfare benefits which they are
denied because of their marital status and the
specificity of their lived experiences of economic
roles and needs.
Contrary to what the opponents of the khul feared,
it is not only rich women who are making use of
this new legal right. In fact, our findings show that
poor women and those with limited financial
means are more likely to resort to khul than other
kinds of divorce in which they do not need to
relinquish their rights to alimony and the dower.
This is because these women lack the financial
and familial support needed to go through a long
litigation process, which is common in cases of
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divorce on the grounds of harm or abandonment.
But it is noteworthy that rather than khul being
exercised by women as a right that is equivalent
to men’s right to unilateral repudiation, it is
increasingly becoming a guaranteed pathway to
what should have been a judicial divorce on the
grounds of harm. The question is: is this outcome
empowering to women?
5 Reform approaches and strategies: lessons
learned
Recent legal reforms in Egyptian family laws
were driven by multiple agendas and actors.
Legislators, the judiciary, and government
officials were keen to get rid of the old court
system which was overloaded and inefficient, and
put in place accessible, affordable and effective
legal services, through developing a concise and
comprehensive body of procedural laws, and the
establishment of a specialised legal system to
handle all family law cases. But the
government’s efforts in reforming family law also
need to be understood within the context of
competing and sometimes conflicting agendas.
On the one hand, the government is constantly
striving to assert its religious legitimacy by
partaking in dominant religious discourses that
regulate family relations and gender roles. On
the other hand, the government sees family law
reform as a means of modernising the country,
enhancing the development process, and
maintaining the support of international
organisations that fund the country’s various
development projects. These conflicting goals
have translated into an uneven process of reform
in family law (Mashhour 2005; Moors 2003;
Singerman 2005).
Abu Odeh (2004) points out that since the
codification of family laws, apart from the
attempt at revolutionary change by President
Sadat in 1979, Egyptian legislators adopted a
partial and gradual approach to reform in order
to accommodate both the advocates for change
and gender equality and the religious
establishments. As a result, this approach did not
seek to change the hierarchical model of
marriage that is sanctioned by Egyptian PSLs in
which the husband provides for his wife and in
exchange the former is granted more rights.
However, Egyptian legislators, Abu Odeh adds,
tried to restrict the power that was granted to
husbands through a number of reforms such as:
extending a husband’s maintenance duties
towards the wife so as to include payment of the
wife’s medical expenses as well as food, clothes
and shelter; granting the wife the right (albeit
restricted one) to judicial divorce; restricting
husband’s right to unilateral divorce and
polygamy through imposing financial deterrence
such as payment of maintenance to a divorced
wife during the waiting period (idda) and
payment of indemnity (mut’a) to a wife divorced
against her wishes. Women’s rights activists are
following a similar trajectory of cautious and
piecemeal reform approach. To pass the new
laws, concessions were made. Contentious
articles were camouflaged in procedural codes.
One could argue that gradual changes and
procedural reforms are not enough to achieve
the goal of a new model of marriage and marital
roles that upholds gender equality. Yet recent
reforms have given women new legal rights and
consequently more choices for women.
In the annual convention held in early November
2008, the National Democratic Party, ruling
party of the Egyptian government, announced an
initiative to introduce a new family code. This
announcement was a culmination of more than a
year’s efforts by the party’s Women’s Committee
to review the current personal status codes,
identify gaps and gender-biased articles, and
propose changes. The party presented its
proposed draft law to the Ministry of Justice. In
addition to the ruling party, the Legislative
Committee at the National Council for Women3
also drafted a number of amendments to the
substantive personal status laws. Government
agencies are by no means the only entities which
have been working toward reforming personal
status laws. Women’s rights groups have been
very active in advocating for comprehensive legal
reforms and have undertaken a number of
initiatives to contribute to the process of
conceptualising and drafting a new law. There
are a number of key proposals that feature in
some way or another in the drafts put together
by the government and women’s rights
organisations although the exact details of the
final drafts are not known. The proposed
changes include: raising the minimum marriage
age for women from 16 to 18; redefining existing
marital roles in terms that are egalitarian and
cooperative rather than hierarchical; abolishing
a husband’s guardianship over his wife and the
latter’s legal obligation to obey him; restricting
the man’s right to unilateral repudiation and
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polygamy; and granting mothers guardianship
rights over their children.
Perhaps these proposed changes reflect a shift
from a tradition of piecemeal and gradual reform
approach to one that is more substantive and seeks
to address the root causes of gender inequality and
injustice that are inherent in the existing laws. But
it is questionable the extent to which the new
approach is being fully and effectively adopted. For
one thing, reform strategies that are being used by
the coalition of reformers remain the same, i.e.
top-down and lacking grassroot societal
participation. In other words, the processes of
formulating and advocating for new laws are still
confined to workshops, seminars, conferences, and
meetings in which the coalition of reformers
mobilise government agencies, members of
religious establishments and some representatives
of the media. But many sectors of society are
either unaware or misinformed of the ongoing
reform efforts. These sectors include Egyptian
women and men at large (many of our
interviewees did not have a good knowledge of the
purpose and procedures of newly passed laws such
as khul), more diverse public thinkers, the majority
of the media, and religious scholars who are not
associated with the government or the religious
establishment. It follows then that regrettably,
none of these sectors are involved in the ongoing
reform efforts.
Legal anthropology and feminist legal scholarship
have deconstructed the myth of law as a rational
positivist entity that exists separate from social
structures and processes (Moore 1978; Shehada
2002). The de-centring of law as an objective
autonomous body of knowledge or as a bounded
and powerful state institution means that we need
to be cognisant of the social structures through
which legal codes are constructed, interpreted,
performed and appropriated. Thus, in 1979, when
the late President Sadat decreed a new personal
status law that allowed Egyptian married women
to automatically file for divorce on the grounds of
their husbands’ taking another wife, and protected
working women from the charge of ‘disobedience’
and loss of spousal financial support, some of the
loudest dissenting voices were those of judges who
felt that the new legislation was imposed on them
and was in conflict with their (social)
understandings of the institution of marriage. The
law was revoked by the Higher Supreme Court a
few years later on technical grounds. What this
example illustrates is the limitations of a top-down
reform approach that fails to recognise the social-
embeddedness of law and does not link the process
of law-making to multilayered engagement with
different forces and domains in the society with
the aim of creating spaces in which new and just
gender roles and relations can be collectively
imagined and realised.
I think we are learning the same lesson from the
unfolding story of the recent reforms in the
family laws. In other words, law-making has to be
integrally tied to law acceptance, and this is
more likely to be achieved if legal reforms are
part and parcel of a larger multilayered and
grassroot-based movement for change.
6 Conclusion: towards just family laws
Egyptian substantive personal status laws
prescribe and affirm a gendered form of
marriage that is unjust to women. In this
institutional narrative, wives are subordinate,
dependent and sexualised. The realities of
Egyptian women, however, demonstrate the
contradictions and the limitations of the legal
model of marriage. In real life, many Egyptian
women are not financially dependent on their
husbands. The model of spousal financial
support in exchange for wifely obedience does
not sustain healthy and happy marriages. And
women suffer not only because of the
contradictions between the legal construction of
marriage and their lived realities but also
because of their legal discrimination and
marginalisation. The recent changes in Egyptian
family law have had mixed impact on the legal
empowerment of women. Women’s rights to
divorce have been expanded. A number of
procedural reforms have been introduced to
make the legal system in family dispute cases
accessible, efficient and effective. But these
procedural reforms have not been successful in
transforming the gendered and hierarchical
model of marriage that continues to be re-
enacted through the existing substantive laws.
It is certain, however, that the new procedural
reforms have created a momentum for change and
started a journey towards a new and
comprehensive substantive family code. Women’s
rights activists are seeking a new legal model of
marriage that is based on equal rights and
responsibilities between husband and wives. But
such a marriage may entail a number of things
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that will affect women differently. For instance, in
this kind of marriage, the wife may no longer enjoy
the exclusive right to her own financial assets,
which she may be obligated to contribute to the
family if there is need. Moreover, it may follow that
she will not be able to file for divorce on the
grounds of lack of maintenance, if she is financially
able. Will this model of marriage be just and good
to all Egyptian women? On the one hand, the
realities of many Egyptian marriages show that
women contribute significantly to the financial
support of the family. Yet, unlike their husbands,
they do not acquire any legal rights from their
financial role. But some women may be
ambivalent or even opposed to being legally
obligated to contribute to the conjugal household
and to give up their claim to the financial support
of the husband in exchange for equal marital and
parental rights. What about women who are not
generating income and do not wish to be employed
in the labour market? How will their non-monetary
labour be credited in the legal discourse?
Lastly, legal reforms (even the most emancipating
ones) are not the end result. These reforms are
only meaningful insofar as they actually lead to
positive and substantive changes in the lives of
those who are targeted by the new laws. This
requires adequate and effective mechanisms of
implementation and enforcement on the one
hand, and a supportive environment on the other.
The establishment of the latter takes time but it
is more possible if the reform process is
participatory and takes place at the grassroot
level. In other words, reform strategies need to go
beyond lobbying the government. What is lacking
in the current reform efforts are building support
among different sectors of the society (religious
scholars, Islamic NGOs, legislators, families and
communities) through dialogue and awareness
raising, and partaking in the process of imparting
to new generations of children and young people
enlightened religious knowledge and sensibilities
that are appreciative of justice, equality and
acceptance and respect for others.
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Notes
1 These were religious scholars who are
members of the Academy for Islamic
Research, which is part of Al-Azhar. The
Academy is in charge of reviewing draft laws
to ensure their compatibility with the
principles and injunctions of Shari’a.
2 Up until 1967, wives who were found
disobedient by the court could be forcibly
returned to the conjugal home by law
enforcement officials, if their husbands so
wished. The practice was then abolished by a
ministerial decree.
3 The National Council for Women was
established by the government in 2000. The
goals of the council are to promote policies to
strengthen women’s rights and enhance their
development; and monitor the
implementation and impact of government
policies that pertain to women.
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